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Abstract
Weanalyze the semantics of ATL∗ and related logics for strategic abilities.
Our focus is on how these logics treat agents’ commitments to strategies
in the process of formula evaluation. We point out some questionable
effects in that respect in the standard semantics, and discuss some al-
ternatives leading to amendments of that semantics. We also propose
and discuss various syntactic and semantics mechanisms for handling
commitments to strategies and release from such commitments in the
semantics of ATL∗, leading to more expressive and semantically refined
versions of that logic.
1 Introduction
Agents inmulti-agent systems commit to strategies and relinquish their com-
mitments in pursuit of their individual and collective goals in a dynamic,
pragmatic, and often quite subtle way. While the semantics of some logics
for multi-agent systems, such as ATL, is based on the notion of strategy, we
claim that these logics do not yet capture adequately the strategic aspect of
agents’ behaviour. For instance, themeaning of anATL formula 〈〈C〉〉γ is that
the coalition C has a collective strategy to bring about the truth of γ. How-
ever, according to the formal semantics of ATL introduced in [3], the evalu-
ation of γ in the possible future runs of the system does not take into account
that strategy anymore. That is, the semantics of ATL does not commit agents to
strategies they choose in order to bring about γ. The standard semantics of
1
Preliminaries: alternating-time temporal logic
ATL does not take into account the strategy context1 when evaluating formu-
lae. This apparent shortcoming of the original semantics of ATL has been
independently addressed in different ways in several recent publications, in-
cluding [1, 5, 8, 4, 10], where various proposals have been made in order to
incorporate strategic commitment in the syntax and semantics of ATL.
In the present paper, which is a follow-up to [1], we analyze the problem
further. Wediscuss someof the proposed solutions, and introduce somenew
mechanisms for managing strategic commitments and release in ATL. The
mainobjective of this extended abstract is to raise anddiscuss the conceptual
issues, rather than to present technical results, which will be included in a
forthcoming full paper.
Before embarking on the actual discussion, wewould like tomake two pre-
liminary remarks:
• Weuse the term commitment (to a strategy) in a specific technical sense.
Thus, our notion of strategic commitment may differ somewhat from
how it has been defined and used elsewhere. The issue is complex and
subtle, allowing for different, possibly mutually exclusive interpreta-
tions, and we make no claim to have captured its full meaning. In
fact, we believe that any formalization of that notion, including ours,
is bound to be incomplete and imprecise.
• Likewise, we use the term goal (of coalitionC) in a precise and technical
sense, to indicate the subformula γ within formula 〈〈C〉〉γ. In doing so,
we ignore the issue of whether agentsmust have goals, how these goals
arise etc. Again, this is a subject of a philosophical discussion which
our paper is not intended to enter.
2 Preliminaries: alternating-time temporal
logic
ATL [3] can be understood as a generalization of the branching time tempo-
ral logic CTL, in which path quantifiers are replaced with so called cooper-
ation modalities. Formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents, expresses
that A have a collective strategy to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae include tempo-
ral operators: “X” (“in the next state”), G (“always from now on”), F (“even-
tually”), and U (“until”). Here, we focus on the unrestricted version of the
logic, usually called ATL∗. Formulae of ATL∗ are defined by the following
grammar:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈〈A〉〉γ, γ ::= φ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | Xγ | γUγ.
1We take this term from [4].
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Additional temporal operators can be defined as: Fγ ≡ >Uφ, and Gφ ≡
¬F¬φ.
The semantics of ATL∗ is defined over concurrent game structures, each in-
cluding a set of agents Agt, states St, actions Act, and atomic propositions
Π, plus a valuation pi : St → P(Π). Function d : Agt × St → P(Act) de-
fines actions available to an agent in a state, and o is a transition function
that assigns the outcome state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a tuple of
actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 that can be executed byAgt in q. A (memory-based) strat-
egy sa : St+ → Act is a conditional plan that specifies what a ∈ Agt is going
to do for every possible situation, as encoded by the current history of the
transition process; strategies that only depend on the current state are called
memoryless or positional. For the semantics of ATL positional strategies suf-
fice, but for the full ATL∗ memory-based strategies are needed (in the sense
that the interpretation of formulae is different if only positional strategies
are used). A collective strategy SA is a tuple of strategies, one per agent from
A ⊆ Agt. A path λ in modelM is an infinite sequence of states that can be
effected by subsequent transitions. We use λ[n] to denote the nth state in λ
(note: we start counting from 0); λ[i..j] denotes the subpath of λ between po-
sitions i and j. Function out(q, SA) returns the set of all paths thatmay result
from agentsA executing strategy SA from state q onward. Then:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬φ iffM, q 6|= φ;
M, q |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iffM, q |= φ1 andM, q |= φ2;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a collective (memory-based) strategy SA such
that, for every λ ∈ out(q, SA)we haveM,λ |= γ;
M,λ |= φ iffM,λ[0] |= φ;
M,λ |= ¬γ iffM,λ 6|= γ;
M,λ |= γ1 ∧ γ2 iffM,λ |= γ1 andM,λ |= γ2;
M,λ |= Xγ iffM,λ[1..∞] |= γ;
M,λ |= γ1Uγ2 iffM,λ[i..∞] |= γ2 for some i ≥ 0, and λ[j..∞] |= γ1 for all
0 ≤ j ≤ i.
3 A critical analysis of the standard seman-
tics of ATL∗
An interesting feature of ATL is that strategies in the logic are not really per-
manent, in the sense that in the evaluation of the goal φ the agent i is no
longer restricted by the strategy she has chosen [1]. That is, if φ includes a
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Figure 1: SystemM0 with a single agent a. The transitions between states are
labeled by the actions chosen by a.
nested cooperation modality for i, then i is again free to choose any strat-
egy to demonstrate the truth of φ. This is in agreement with the semantics
of CTL path quantifiers, where it is natural to express facts like “there is a
path, such that the system can always deviate from the path to another path
which satisfies φ” (EGEφ). However, it somehow contradicts the usual game-
theoretical view of a strategy as a conditional plan that completely specifies
the agent’s future behavior.
3.1 Revocability of strategies in the semantics of ATL∗
To illustrate that the meaning of ATL formulae can sometimes run contrary
to intuition, let us consider an example from [1]:
Example 1 We are given a system with a shared resource, and we are interested
in reasoning about whether agent a has access to the resource. Let p denote the fact
that agent a controls the resource. The ATL formula 〈〈a〉〉Xp expresses the fact that
a is able to obtain control of the resource in the next moment, if she chooses to.
Now imagine that agent a does not need to access the resource all the time, but she
would like to be able to control the resource any time she needs it. Intuitively, this
is expressed in ATL by the formula 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp, saying that a has a strategy which
guarantees that, in any future state of the system, a can always force the next state
to be one where a controls the resource.
Consider systemM0 from Figure 1. We have thatM0, q1 |= 〈〈a〉〉Xp: a can choose
action α2, which guarantees that p is true next. But we also have that M0, q1 |=
〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp: a’s strategy in this case is to always choose α1, which guarantees
that the system will stay in q1 forever and, as we have seen, M0, q1 |= 〈〈a〉〉Xp.
However, this system does not have the exact property we had in mind because, by
following that strategy, the agent a dooms herself to never access the resource
– in which case it is maybe counter-intuitive that 〈〈a〉〉Xp should be true. In other
words, a can ensure that she is forever able to access the resource – but only by never
actually accessing it. Indeed, while a can force the possibility of achieving p to be
true forever, the actual achievement of p destroys that possibility.
Control design and algorithm design are contexts where the original seman-
tics of ATL clearly doesnotworkwell. Consider a systemwith agents/processes
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Agt; the most natural model includes all the actions that can be in principle
executed by the processes, plus appropriate state transformations as transi-
tions. Now, e.g., 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈b〉〉Fp has a natural reading as: “process a can (by
choosing the right strategy) control the system so that property p is always
achievable for b”. Such a statement refers thus to a’s control over things that
can be executed by other processes. Of course, such control can be imposed
only when the strategy chosen by a influences the evaluation of 〈〈b〉〉Fp (like
in our “Irrevocable ATL” [1] and unlike in the original ATL).
Example 2 Suppose thatwe dealwith a computational system; then 〈〈a〉〉 . . . 〈〈b〉〉 . . . ϕ
can be aswell understood as “there is an algorithm for process a so that b can/cannot
bring about ϕ”. For example, we may want the operating system to be designed in
such a way that no process can crash the system, neither individually nor collec-
tively. This can be specified as: 〈〈os〉〉G¬〈〈Agt〉〉Fcrash. In the original semantics
of ATL, the evaluation of ¬〈〈Agt〉〉Fcrash is independent from the strategy that has
been chosen for 〈〈os〉〉, which suggests that the operating system has no influence
whatsoever on states that the other processes can bring about.
3.2 Strategic updates in the process of formula evalu-
ation
In the standard semantics of ATL∗, agents are completely free to change their
strategies in the evaluation of subformulas, in order to achieve the respec-
tive new goals appearing there. Perhaps the best argument in favour of such
choice is the compositionality of the semantics of ATL∗. However, this com-
positionality comes at a questionable price. To illustrate the possible side
effects of that semantics, let us consider onemore example:
Example 3 Consider the ATL-formula
A = 〈〈1, 2〉〉F〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp,
where 1, 2, 3 are agents and p is an atomic proposition.
LetM be any concurrent gamemodel and q a state inM . Then,M, q |= 〈〈1, 2〉〉F〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp
means that agents 1, 2 have a strategy profile 〈s1, s2〉 so that on every computa-
tion λ in M compatible with that strategy profile there is a state λ[n] such that
M,λ[n] |= 〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp. Note first, that the strategy profile 〈s1, s2〉 does not feature at
all in the evaluation of 〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp at the state λ[n] inM . Therefore, in order to justify
the truth of Gp, the standard semantics of ATL∗ allows any strategy profile 〈t2, t3〉
for the agents 2, 3 to be selected, that would guarantee that truth on all computa-
tions compatible with it, even though the strategy t2 may deviate from the earlier
chosen strategy s2 for agent 2; moreover, the strategy of agent 1 is no longer taken
into account, either.
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This phenomenon seems objectionable, not only conceptually, but and
from technical viewpoint: it leads to rather questionable logical equivalences
in ATL∗, such as 〈〈A〉〉〈〈B〉〉p ≡ 〈〈B〉〉p for any coalitions (intersecting or not) of
agentsA andB.
A partial remedy to the problem has been suggested already in [3], where
so called Game Logic (GL) was introduced. In GL, the (existential) quan-
tification over strategies and the (universal) quantification over the outcome
computations are decoupled into separate strategyquantifiers andpathquan-
tifiers. Moreover, three types of formulae are introduced: state, path, and
tree formulae. Then, a strategy context is introduced for the evaluation of a
tree formula prefixed with a strategy quantifier:
M, q |= ∃IA.θ iff there is a strategy profile SA for the coalition A,
such thatM, comp(M, q, SA) |= θ,
where comp(M, q, SA) is the tree of all computations compatible with SA.
However, because the strategy context is not preservedwhen passing to eval-
uationof state subformulae, a similar effect occurs inGL, too, e.g., ∃IA.∃IB.p ≡
∃IB.p for any coalitionsA andB.
So, what are the reasonable alternatives to the standard semantics of ATL∗
that address the issue discussed above? Let us analyze them using again the
formula 〈〈1, 2〉〉F〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp.
1. At the point of evaluation of 〈〈1, 2〉〉F〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp the strategies of agents 1
and 2 are selected andfixed, sowhen evaluating the subformula 〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp
only the strategy of agent 3 can vary.
This is the alternative adopted in [1], where commitment to strategies
is considered irrevocable. This choice leads to different semantics, de-
pending on whether memory-based or positional strategies are con-
sidered; both versions have been discussed in that paper. We write
M, q |=IATL φ andM, q |=MIATL φ for satisfaction under positional (memo-
ryless) and memory-based irrevocable strategies, respectively. The dif-
ference between the irrevocable and the standard semantics is illus-
trated in themodel of Example 1,wherewehave:M0, q1 |=ATL 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp,
butM0, q1 6|=IATL 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp andM0, q1 6|=MIATL 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp.
Shortcomings of this choice:
• First, it imposes unnecessarily strong commitmentswhen the goals
are local (next-state goals) or eventualities – there is no rational
reason why an agent should remain committed to a strategy after
the goal has been achieved. As an example, consider the model in
Figure 2. We have that:
M1, q1 |=IATL 〈〈1〉〉X ((〈〈2〉〉XAX¬p) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉XAXp), and
M1, q1 |=MIATL 〈〈1〉〉X ((〈〈2〉〉XAX¬p) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉XAXp).
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α2, β
q1 ¬p
α, β1
α2, β
q3 q5
q4
q2
¬p ¬p
p
α1, β
α, β
α1, βα1, β
q6
α, β
α2, β
α, β2
Figure 2: SystemM1 with two agents a and b. The transitions between states
are labeled by the actions chosen by a (left) and b (right).
In the first case the strategy for the first path quantifier (agent 1) is
q1 7→ α1, q3 7→ α1, q5 7→ α2; the strategy for the second path quan-
tifier (agent 2) is q2 7→ β1; the strategy for the third path quantifier
(agent 2) is q2 7→ β2. The formula says that in state q1, agent 1
has the power to ensure that in the next state, agent 2 can alone
choose whether in the next state after that p will be true in all
following states, or false. But looking at the model, this property
might seem counterintuitive. The irrevocable semantics requires
agent 1 to choose a strategy for any future circumstance, even if the
formula after 〈〈1〉〉 refers only towhat happens at the nextmoment.
Consequently, that strategy will be in effect forever. So, in evalu-
ating 〈〈1〉〉X ((〈〈2〉〉XAX¬p) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉XAXp) in q1, we must come up
with a witness strategy for agent 1 which not only chooses α1 in q1
(ensuring that the next state is q2 and not q6) but which also must
make a choice in q3 and q5. In the irrevocable semantics that strat-
egy is still in effect when evaluating (〈〈2〉〉XAX¬p) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉XAXp in
q2. In the present paperwe address this issue by consideringmech-
anisms for release of commitments.
• Second, it leads to a non-compositional semantics – the truth of
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a formula is now dependent not only on the model and state, but
also on the strategy context, i.e. the currently committed strate-
gies. We argue that the sacrifice of compositionality is inevitable
here.2
2. At the point of evaluation of 〈〈1, 2〉〉F〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp the strategies of agents
1 and 2 are selected and fixed, but when evaluating the subformula
〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp the agent 2 is granted the freedom to change her strategy in order
to achieve the current goal, viz. Gp. Thus, both agents 2 and 3 can choose
new strategies, and moreover they can do that under the assumption
that agent 1 remains committed to his strategy selected at the point of
evaluation of 〈〈1, 2〉〉F〈〈2, 3〉〉Gp.
This is the alternative chosen in [4]. As demonstrated there, it leads to
a quite expressive language (apparently more expressive than the pre-
vious alternative), especially when combined with the mechanism for
“forgetting” strategies that have been selected.
On the other hand, the resulting semantics is still non-compositional.
Moreover, it raises the conceptual objection of not being faithful to the
very concept of “strategy” which is usually understood as a complete
specification of an agent’s behaviour.
It would be instructive to compare the situation with the mechanism for
quantification and variable binding in first-order logic. When evaluating a
first order formula ∃xA(x) in a given structure, an appropriate value for x
is chosen and fixed throughout the evaluation of the subformula A(x). On the
other hand, when evaluating e.g., ∃x(A(x)∧∃xB(x)), the value of x assigned
at the point of evaluation of the whole formula has no bearing anymore
when the subformula ∃xB(x) is evaluated, and to justify its truth any other
value of x can be selected. Thus, the semantics of first-order logic is in line
with the second alternative discussed above. However, there is a subtle but
important difference here: in first-order logic quantifiers may happen to use
the same label (bound variable), but that does not mean that they refer to
the same element of the domain. On the other hand, different occurrences
of 〈〈a〉〉 seem to refer to the same object: namely, the strategy that is effectively
going to be executed by the agent.
Example 4 Consider the design of the operating system from Example 2. Obvi-
ously, in such a context, the os’s strategy behind 〈〈Agt〉〉 should be bound by the one
already assigned to 〈〈os〉〉, and not the other way around. The designer of the operat-
ing system looks for an algorithm (strategy) that prevents the system from crashing;
2This does not mean that there is no compositional semantics. But we suspect that it would
be rather technical and unintuitive, as e.g. in the case of Hodges’ semantics for the Indepen-
dence Friendly logic.
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if the operating system itself changes its algorithm at runtime, the new algorithm
may not guarantee this property any more.
3.3 Anamendedsemantics forATL∗ andtheGameLogic
with strategy contexts
In both alternatives to the original semantics of ATL∗, considered above, a
strategy context is being accumulated and taken into account throughout
the process of formula evaluation; the difference is in the order of commit-
ting and overruling strategies: from outside inwards in alternative 1, and from
inside outwards in alternative 2. That difference, however, affects the seman-
tics in both alternatives considerably. Regardless of the specific choice of that
order, we insist that it is reasonable to take strategy contexts into account in
the evaluation of every formula.
Such strategy context can be effected technically by applying a (tempo-
rary)model update, as in [1], that fixes the actions available to the agents with
strategies listed in the context, in accordance with these strategies. Thus, ev-
ery state formula of ATL∗ is evaluated in the amended semantics at a triple
(model, state, strategy context); respectively, every path formula of ATL∗ is
evaluated at a triple (model, computation, strategy context), where the com-
putation must be compatible with the current strategy context. Like [4], we
will use collective strategies to represent current commitments of agents. For
a collective strategy SA, we define SA|B as the part of strategy SA that refers
to the agents from B as well. Then, strategy SA is consistent with strategy
RB iff their common part agree, i.e. SA|B = RB |A. Like [4], we also de-
fine the update of commitment, but unlike [4] we assume that commitments
persist: SA ◦ RB is a strategy T for agents A ∪ B, such that T |A = SA, and
T |(B \ A) = R|(B \ A). Now, we can re-write the semantics of “Irrevocable
ATL” from [1] as follows:
M, q, S |= p iff p ∈ pi(q);
M, q, S |= ¬φ iffM, q, S 6|= φ;
M, q, S |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iffM, q, S |= φ1 andM, q, S |= φ2;
M, q, S |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a collective memoryless strategy FA consistent
with S, such that for every λ ∈ out(q, S ◦ FA)we haveM,λ, S ◦ FA |= γ;
M,λ, S |= φ iffM,λ[0], S |= φ;
M,λ, S |= ¬γ iffM,λ, S 6|= γ;
M,λ, S |= γ1 ∧ γ2 iffM,λ, S |= γ1 andM,λ, S |= γ2;
M,λ, S |= Xγ iffM,λ[1..∞], S |= γ;
M,λ, S |= γ1Uγ2 iffM,λ[i..∞], S |= γ2 for some i ≥ 0, and λ[j..∞], S |= γ1
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i.
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One advantage of having strategy contexts is that it is easy now to define
commitments that can be released at some moment in the future, since the
“hard” structure of themodel does not change during the evaluation of a for-
mula (see Section 4.2 for some proposals). Another advantage is that defin-
ing the “full memory” variant of IATL is now straightforward: it is enough to
replace “memoryless” with “full memory” in the semantic clause for 〈〈A〉〉γ,
and we get semantics for what we call MIATL* in [1].
Note that a similar update of the semantics can be considered for Game
Logic. For instance, the amended GL semantics of ∃IC becomes:
M, q, S |= ∃IA.θ iff there is a collective strategy FA, consistent with
S, such thatM, q, S ◦ FA |= θ.
4 Mechanisms for strategycommitmentand
release in ATL∗
Here, following our choice in [1], we adopt alternative 1 from Section 3.2.
However, as mentioned earlier, we concede that the semantics of irrevocable
strategies introduced in [1] is too rigid and unnecessarily restrictive in han-
dling the strategic choices of the agents. We therefore consider here mecha-
nisms for agents’ dynamic commitments to strategies and releases from such
strategies in the process of evaluation of formulae.
We distinguish two types of suchmechanisms: semantic and syntactic. The
former mechanisms are built into the semantics and there are no syntac-
tic means to interfere with them explicitly, while the syntactic mechanisms
leave the control on the update within the formula itself.
4.1 Semanticmechanisms for strategy update
There are various options, with different levels of sophistication here. Again,
the two extremities are:
• the standard ATL∗: complete freedom of update at every evaluation of
a (sub)formula 〈〈C〉〉;
• ATL∗ with irrevocable strategies, as in [1]: once a strategy for an agent
is selected in the process of evaluation of a formula, it remains fixed
throughout that evaluation.
Here is a sample running story:
Three researchers, Alex, Bob, and Chris, work in the same scientific area.
Alex and Bob decide to write a paper together. We will refer to it as Pa-
per. They commit themselves to not start working on any other paper,
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alone, together, or with anyone else until they complete and submit Pa-
per. Thus, the commitment is only temporary: until the goal is achieved.
Once that is done, each one of them is free to release their commitment
and start new research endeavors.
The story suggests a more refined option: to modify the semantics with
irrevocable strategies in a goal-driven style, by letting agents commit to strate-
gies only for as long as necessary to achieve their goals; e.g., for 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ the
goal-driven semantics commits the agents inC to a strategy only until the goal
ψ is achieved, and then automatically releases them from the commitment.
Back to the running story:
For various reasons, the goal of Alex and Bob may never be achieved.
That may become obvious gradually or suddenly, say, if Alex or Bob gets
a very lucrative offer from the non-research world and decides to quit re-
search, or develops incapacitating mental illness, or simply dies. Now,
in that situation, it would make no sense for the other researcher to still
faithfully adhere to his/her commitment, as it is certain that it will not
bring about realization of the original goal.
Thus, itmakes good sense tomake provision for “escape clauses” and to re-
fine the “goal-driven semantics” to a pragmatic one, where the commitment of
the agent only last until either the goal is achieved, or it becomes unachievable ever
in the future. In that case an automatic release from a commitment would be
justified, and probably necessary in order to achieve other goals. This issue
closely resembles the discussion on intention adoption and revision within
the BDI community, which started with [6] and continues to this day [9].
However, we observe that defining such a semantics is not as straightfor-
ward as it seems. Suppose that we want to assume that, in the evaluation of
〈〈C〉〉Fφ, C are committed to their strategy only until φ is achieved, and then
they are automatically released from their commitment. The point is, φ is
thewholeofwhat comes after 〈〈C〉〉F , so there is no further subformulawhich
will be evaluated without the commitment. Thus, the evaluation of 〈〈C〉〉Fφ
yields the same result with and without such automatic release of commit-
ments! Note that, in most cases, the shape of the actual specification would
be 〈〈C〉〉F(φ∧〈〈C〉〉ψ), where φ specifies the “current” goal, andψ a possible fu-
ture goal. In this case, onemay expect that the agents inC are committed to
their first strategy as long as they pursue Fφ (or, until it becomes impossible
to obtain), and then they are free again to choose their best policy towards
ψ. It seems, however, that there are too many different cases to allow for a
uniform semantic solution. We believe that syntactic means (discussed fur-
ther in Section 4.2) provemore flexible: onemust specify explicitly what the
“current goal” is, and impose release as soon as it is achieved.
One viable semantic approach is to only consider least commitment strate-
gies. Recall that a problem with the irrevocable semantics, which we illus-
trated in Section 3.2 (using Figure 2), is that an agent is required to commit
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to actions in all future circumstances, also those which are not relevant for
achieving the goal states. The reason for this is that strategies in ATL are to-
tal functions. A perhaps natural variant of the irrevocable semantics is to,
instead, allow also partial functions as strategies (“partial strategies”). Par-
tial strategies are also used in [2] where agents with bounded memory are
considered (albeit not in the context of irrevocable strategies). The simplest
case is the next-state operator. Changing the semantics in this case to only
consider least commitment strategies correspond to only considering partial
functions prescribing an action in the current state. Thus, in the model in
Figure 2, we would have that
M1, q1 6|= 〈〈1〉〉X ((〈〈2〉〉XAX¬p) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉XAXp)
(for both memoryless and memory-bound variants). But would this not be
throwing the baby out with the bath water; are we not back to the stan-
dard ATL* semantics if we take this idea seriously? We argue that we are
not. Consider again themodel in Figure 1. Recall that we haveM0, q1 |=ATL∗
〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp, butM0, q1 6|=IATL 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp. If we only consider least com-
mitment strategies (together with the irrevocable semantic interpretation),
we would still haveM0, q1 6|= 〈〈a〉〉G〈〈a〉〉Xp.
As a further example of the subtleties of commitments, let us consider our
running story dynamically.
During the period of commitment, i.e. while Alex and Bob are working
on the Paper, each of them may undertake other commitments, for as
long as they are consistent with the one above.3 Suppose, for instance,
that at some stage Chris approaches Bob with the proposal to start work-
ing on a paper together. Bob cannot accept the proposal at thatmoment,
but can say : ‘OK, I have promised Alex not to start working on anything
else until we submit our paper with her. But, I can promise to you now to
start working with you as soon as we are done with Alex, and not to undertake
any similar promise with anyone else.
This is another commitment, and one that refers to the future.
4.2 Syntacticmechanisms for strategy update
Many of the semantic subtleties and complications suggested above can be
controlled within the object language, in the formulae themselves, and this
is the underlying idea of the syntactic approach. Again, there is a variety of
meaningful proposals for enrichment of the language of ATL∗ with means
for explicit control over the strategic commitments and releases. Here we
briefly discuss two such proposals:
3 It is a challenge, however, to define precisely the notion of “consistency” of commitments.
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1. Add strategic operators 〈〈C/θ〉〉ψ, meaning:
Coalition C has a strategy such that, if committed to it until θ becomes true,
and then relinquished, will guarantee that ψ is true.
Example: 〈〈A/θ〉〉G¬〈〈B〉〉Fψmeans: “Coalition A has a strategy such that
coalition B will never have a strategy to achieve ψ, even after θ becomes true
andA’s commitment is released”.
Remark: we acknowledge a problem here: if the goal θ involves future
operators, its achievement is subject to the strategy context, and the re-
lease of a coalition from its strategic commitment may hinder the suc-
cess of the goal.
2. Another solution is to add to the language of ATL∗ explicit operators:
commit (the agents in C to their strategies): 〈〈↓C〉〉, and
release (the agents in C from their strategy commitment): 〈〈↑C〉〉
Example: 〈〈↓A〉〉G((φ∨〈〈∅〉〉G¬φ) → 〈〈↑A〉〉G〈〈B〉〉Fψ)means: ‘the coalition
A has a strategy such that, if committing to it until the goal φ is achieved or
becomes untenable and then relinquishing that strategy, the coalition B will
always have a strategy to achieve the goal ψ’.
We note that the release operator 〈〈↑ C〉〉 is very similar to the ’forget’
operator, independently proposed in [4].
5 Expressiveness, satisfiabilityandmodel check-
ingofATL∗withstrategycommitmentand
release
The introduction of either semantic or syntactic mechanisms for strategy
commitment and release generally increases the expressiveness of ATL and
ATL∗, as demonstrated in [1] and [4]. The precise analysis and comparison
of the expressiveness for the variations introduced here is still under inves-
tigation. However, at least in the case of ATL with irrevocable strategies in-
troduced in [1], as well as its refinementwith semanticmechanism for strate-
gic update discussed above, satisfiability remains decidable (in EXPTIME), by
suitable adaptation of the incremental tableau-based decision procedure for
ATL recently developed in [7]. However, at present it is still unknown if the
syntactic mechanisms for strategic update proposed here do not lead to un-
decidable satisfiability.
As for model checking, the results from [4] suggest that the problem is
PSPACE-complete for ATL with irrevocable memoryless strategies (with and
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without release of commitments). The complexity of model checking irre-
vocable memory-based strategies is still an open question.
6 Concluding remarks
The issues discussed here, viz., how agents commit to strategies and relin-
quish such commitments in a dynamic multi-agent environment, are con-
ceptually deep and subtle. We do not purport to provide a philosophical so-
lution to them, but rather discussmechanisms for their formal handling and
the formal consequences for the logical semantics ensuing from the adop-
tion of such mechanisms. This is just a beginning of a systematic treatment
of that topic; here we have only scratched the surface of the dynamics of
strategic commitments and releases of agents – and it is not known yet what
exactly lies beneath that surface, and even less how to best formalize it.
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